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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1973, all federal courts have used the three-stage analysis established 
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green l to decide a vast majority of intentional 
employment discrimination cases.2 During the 1990s, an increasing number of 
commentators criticized the McDonnell Douglas test, particularly the first 
stage, the so-called "prima facie case.") At the dawn of a new decade, in 2000, 
the Supreme Court reconsidered the McDonnell Douglas test for the first time 
in years in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.4 How did the Court 
treat the prima facie case, given the strong criticisms that had been leveled 
against it for several years? The Reeves Court made the prima facie case more 
important than ever. 
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.S. 1985, Cornell University; 
J.D. 1988, University of Virginia. I thank my former Employment Discrimination student, Amy Askew, whose 
perceptive questions put me on the path to writing this article. I am grateful to my research assistant, Amanda 
Cope, for all the outstanding work she has done on this project for more than a year. Finally, I thank the 
University of Baltimore for providing financial support. 
I. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
2. See id. at 802-05. 
3. See, e.g., Denny Chin & Jodi Go1insky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method 
for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 659, 668-69 (1998); Deborah C. 
Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2243-47, 2282-88, 
2298-2300,2318-19 {I 995); Stephen W. Smith, Title VII's National Anthem: Is There a Prima Facie Case for 
the Prima Facie Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371, 372-78 (1997) (explaining several criticisms of prima facie case); 
see also Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1336-37 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing prima facie case and 
strongly indicating limited usefulness of prima facie evidence in deciding discrimination cases); William R. 
Corbett, Of Babies, Bathwater and Throwing Out Proof Structures: It's Not Time to Jellison McDonnell 
Douglas, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'y J. 361, 367 (1998) (acknowledging Professor Malamud "clearly correct 
about the shortcomings of the prima facie case"); Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step. Burden-
Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 703, 704-05 {I 995) (summarizing 
criticisms of McDonnell Douglas approach). 
4. 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
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In Reeves, the Supreme Court held for the first time that the strength of the 
prima facie case should be one of the main factors that courts consider when, at 
the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, they decide whether the 
plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find intentional 
discrimination.5 From 1983, when the Supreme Court decided United States 
Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,6 until Reeves, the Court's 
position had been that after the employer produced evidence of a 
nondiscriminatory reason for firing or rejecting the plaintiff, the prima facie 
case was no longer relevant.7 In Reeves, the Court held that the prima facie 
case, along with the evidence regarding the employer's reason for its action, 
were factors that should be considered in deciding whether to dismiss the 
plaintiffs case.8 
The Reeves decision marked a significant enhancement in the role of the 
prima facie case. Originally, the prima facie case played a screening function: 
the plaintiffs proof of the prin~a facie case factual elements (for example, that 
the plaintiff had applied for a position or met minimum qualifications for the 
job) served only to "eliminate[] the most common non-discriminatory reasons 
for the [employer's action].,,9 The plaintiffs proof of the prima facie case also 
impelled the employer to assert its nondiscriminatory reason for its action. If 
the plaintiff proved a prima facie case, and the employer failed to rebut it with a 
nondiscriminatory reason, then the employer would 10se.1O Once the plaintiff 
established a prima facie case, the analysis turned to the credibility of the 
employer's proffered reason for its action and to any evidence of 
discriminatory motive. 11 Thus, the prima facie case would no longer be 
germane. 
In Reeves, the Supreme Court apparently changed all that. The Court said 
that the relevance of the prima facie case does not end once the employer 
asserts its reason for its action. 12 The Court also said that the issue regarding 
5. Id. at 148. 
6. 460 U.S. 711 (1983). 
7. See infra Part II.B (explaining limitations Aikens imposed on relevance of prima facie case in latter 
stages of McDonnell Douglas analysis). 
8. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49 (listing factors court may consider when deciding judgment as a matter of 
law motion). 
9. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981); see also infra Part III.A 
(discussing elements of prima case defined by the Supreme Court and by lower federal courts). 
10. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55 (explaining defendant's burden following plaintiff's establishment of 
prima facie case). In order to carry its burden, the defendant must proffer evidence of a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. Id.; see also Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 
1292 (II th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging prima facie case functions to compel employers to assert 
nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions). 
II. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973) (identifying evidence relevant 
to showing of employer pretext). 
12. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148-49 (explaining ongoing relevance of 
strength of prima face case). 
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the plaintiffs prima facie case was no longer limited to whether the plaintiff 
had proven it, but how strong (or weak) that proof was. 13 Thus, a plaintiff who 
has proven the elements of her prima facie case in the first stage can no longer 
rest assured that she has done all that the court requires of her. At the third 
stage, the issue of the prima facie case returns, popping up like an ad on the 
Internet, and this time the plaintiff must convince the court that her prima facie 
case is not only sufficient, but also "strong.,,14 
This article contends that it is a mistake to allow the prima facie case to play 
a significant role in the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. 
Additionally, this article explains how the Aikens decision offered crucial 
insight into the proper role of the prima facie case in adjudging discrimination 
claims, and correctly concluded that the prime facie case should not be 
considered after the employer has presented a reason for its challenged action. 
Finally, this article argues that the Reeves decision, by making "strength of the 
prima facie case" a factor to be considered at the final stage of the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis, threatens to give the traditional prima facie case far greater 
weight than is sensible or just. IS 
Fortunately, the Reeves decision did not expressly overrule Aikens, and there 
is a plausible interpretation of Reeves that would leave intact the limits Aikens 
imposed on consideration of the prime facie case. This article argues that in 
Reeves's list of factors to be considered on summary judgment, the term "prima 
facie case" should be interpreted to mean all the evidence the plaintiff has 
offered to prove discrimination, rather than the very different and much 
narrower set of facts that have traditionally been used to define the term "prima 
facie case." 
This article first explains the role the prima facie case has played in 
discrimination cases, from its creation in McDonnell Douglas through the 
Supreme Court's decisions in Aikens and Reeves, up to the application of 
Reeves by lower courts in the past several years. 16 Next, this article focuses on 
Reeve's identification of "strength of the prima facie case" as a factor to be 
considered on summary judgment, and discusses why it would be unwise and 
unworkable to interpret the words "prima facie case" in that factor as having 
the same meaning as the "prima facie case" proved in the first stage of the 
McDonnell Douglas framework. 17 Finally, this article explains how and why 
courts should prevent the prima facie case from "popping up" again in the third 
stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, where it would distort and disrupt the 




16. See infra Part II (providing overview of McDonnell Douglas prima facie case jurisprudence). 
17. See infra Part III (discussing meaning of prima facie case at different stages of analysis). 
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discrimination claim should go to a jury.18 
II. THE ROLE OF THE PRIMA FACIE CASE 
A. The McDonnell Douglas Analysis 
For more than thirty years, courts have used the three-stage McDonnell 
Douglas analysis to evaluate most claims of intentional discrimination. 19 In the 
first stage, the plaintiff must meet its "initial burden ... of establishing a prima 
facie case of racial [or other] discrimination," which the plaintiff can do by 
proving specified factual elements.2o If the plaintiff carries her prima facie 
burden, then at the second stage the burden shifts to the defendant (usually an 
employer) to produce evidence of a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for 
the adverse action taken against the plaintiff.21 Finally, at the third stage, the 
plaintiff has an opportunity to prove that the reason given by the employer at 
the second stage is a "pretext", and that the true reason for the employer's 
action is discrimination?2 
The McDonnell Douglas three-stage structure is still the standard mode of 
analysis used by courts in deciding intentional discrimination cases, though that 
could be changing. Some courts and commentators have concluded that the 
Supreme Court overruled McDonnell Douglas in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa. 23 
In Costa, the Supreme Court addressed a split among the circuits regarding the 
level of evidence necessary to qualify for the so-called "mixed-motive" 
instruction established by Section 107 of the 1991 amendments to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.24 The Costa court rejected the view of some lower courts 
that the plaintiff must present "direct evidence" of discrimination to qualify for 
the mixed-motive instruction, and held that "a plaintiff need only present 
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that [a protected characteristic] was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice" to obtain the instruction.25 
Although the Costa decision never mentions McDonnell Douglas, a few 
federal district courts have held that Costa overruled or dramatically undercut 
18. See infra Part IV (suggesting way in which to interpret Reeves consistent with Aikens). 
19. See Underwood v. Perry County Comm'n, 431 F.3d 788, 794-95 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying 
McDonnell Douglas framework to case decided in December 2005). 
20. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 41 I U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The factual elements will vary 
depending on the particular circumstances alleged in a given case. [d. at 802 n.13. 
21. [d. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court required the employer to "articulate" such a reason. [d. Later, 
in Burdine, the Court clarified that the employer's burden at the second stage was to produce admissible 
evidence of one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs 
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981). 
22. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05. 
23. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
24. [d. at 92, 95, 98. 
25. [d. at 10 I. 
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the McDonnell Doug/as analysis. These courts have reasoned that, under 
Costa, the Section 107 instruction should apply to all intentional discrimination 
cases, thus obviating the McDonnell Douglas analysis.26 Similarly, three 
commentators contend that Costa has, in effect, "killed" the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis.27 
The post-mortems for McDonnell Douglas are premature. No circuit court 
has yet concluded that Costa overruled McDonnell Douglas, and already some 
have held that it did not.28 Meanwhile, as one set of commentators observed in 
declaring McDonnell Douglas to be "alive and well," most courts continue to 
apply the McDonnell Douglas analysis to intentional discrimination cases?9 
Some courts have held that, after Costa, plaintiffs may choose whether to prove 
their cases by using the McDonnell Douglas framework or by "demonstrating" 
that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the employer.3o In 
addition, Costa may not affect the application of the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis to claims of age discrimination.31 As noted, the Costa court based its 
decision on an interpretation of Section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a 
statute that amended Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act but 
failed to amend or even mention the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA).32 Consequently, a majority of courts and commentators have 
26. See, e.g., Veeder v. Cargill, Inc., No. 02-1711, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23245, at ·18 (D. Minn. Dec. 
23,2003); Griffith v. City of Des Moines, No. 01-10537, 2003 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 14365, at ·36 (S.D. Iowa July 
3, 2003), aff'd 387 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2004); Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990-92 (D. 
Minn. 2003). 
27. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate 
Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 95-96 (2004) [hereinafter Chambers, Effect]; William R. Corbett, 
McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199,212-14 (2003); 
Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roil": An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas 
and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case after Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 
52 DRAKEL. REv. 71, 72-73 (2003). 
28. See Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (II th Cir. 2004); Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 
387 F.3d 733, 735-36 (8th Cir. 2004). The Eighth Circuit's rejection of the proposition that Costa overruled 
McDonnell Douglas is especially significant because two of the federal district courts that had held otherwise, 
the District of Minnesota and the Southern District of Iowa, are within the jurisdiction of the Eighth Circuit. 
See supra note 26. 
29. See Christopher R. Hedican, Jason M. Hedican & Mark P.A. Hudson, McDonnell Douglas: Alive and 
Well, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 383, 413-14; Matthew R. Scott & Russell D. Chapman, Much Ado About Nothing-
Why Desert Palace Neither Murdered McDonnell Douglas Nor Transformed All Employment Discrimination 
Cases to Mixed-Motive, 36 ST. MARY'S LJ. 395, 396 (2005). 
30. See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2004); McGinest v. GTE 
Servo Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004); Rishel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 854, 865 
(M.D.N.C. 2003); Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180,1197-98 (N.D. Iowa 
2003). 
31. See Daniel K. Brough, Note & Comment, Adams v. Florida Power Corp. and the Trend of Lowering 
an Employer's Burden of Proof to Rebut Age Discrimination Claims, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1097, 1113 & n.87 
(noting most courts have held McDonnell Douglas analysis applies to intentional age discrimination claims). 
32. See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VI/, and the Civil Rights Act of 
1991: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1093, 1153-55 (1993) (excerpting text of 
Section 107 and noting it did not explicitly amend ADEA). 
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concluded that Section 107 does not apply to age discrimination.33 
Accordingly, in the near future at least, courts will continue to apply the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis to hundreds of intentional discrimination claims 
every year. 
B. The Effect oj Aikens 
In Aikens, an African-American postal employee claimed that the U.S. 
Postal Service discriminated against him due to his race by refusing to promote 
him to higher positions in the Washington, D.C. Post Office where he had 
worked for decades.34 After a bench trial, the district court judge entered 
judgment for the defendant employer?5 The trial judge dismissed the 
plaintiff's claim, in part, because he failed to show he was '''as qualified or 
more qualified' than the people who were promoted," and thus did not prove 
his prima facie case.36 The D.C. Circuit held that the district court erred in 
requiring the plaintiff to make such a showing as part of his prima facie case.37 
Before the Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued that he submitted sufficient 
evidence to prove a prima facie case, while the employer contended that he had 
not.38 
After summarizing the posture of the case and the parties' arguments, the 
Supreme Court declared, "[b ]ecause this case was fully tried on the merits, it is 
surprising to find the parties and the Court of Appeals still addressing the 
question whether Aikens made out aprimajacie case.,,39 The Court added that, 
by "framing the issue" in terms of the prima facie case, the parties and appeals 
court ''unnecessarily evaded the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.',40 
The Supreme Court next discussed the role of the prima facie case in the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis, explaining that "[b]y establishing a prima facie 
33. See, e.g., Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 339-40 (4th Cir. 2004) (expressing doubts regarding 
Section 107's applicability to ADEA); Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 598-99 & n.IO (3rd Cir. 1995) 
(holding Section 107 inapplicable to ADEA); Michael C. Harper, ADEA Doctrinal Impediments to the 
Fulfillment of the Wirtz Report Agenda, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 757, 772-74 (1997) (noting circuit courts do not 
apply Section 107's mixed-motive analysis to ADEA claims); Eglit, supra note 32, at 1158-72 (evaluating 
legislative history regarding Section lO7's impact on ADEA). But see Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312 (concluding 
Costa applies to ADEA). The Fifth Circuit reasoned that, because of the similarities in the language of Title 
VII and the ADEA, Costa is applicable to age discrimination. Rachid, 376 F.3d at 311. As noted, however, the 
Rachid court explained that Costa did not overrule, but only "modified," the McDonnell Douglas analysis. See 
id. at 312-13. 
34. U.S. Postal Servo Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 712 (1983). 
35. /d. at 713. 
36. Id. (quoting Aikens V. U.S. Postal Servo Bd. of Governors, 665 F.2d 1057, 1058-59 (D.C. Cif. 1981) 
(per curiam)). 
37. Id. 
38. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 713. 
39. /d. at 713-14. 
40. /d. at 714. 
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case, the plaintiff ... creates a rebuttable 'presumption'" of discrimination.41 
The employer can rebut this presumption, the Court observed, by producing 
admissible evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for its action.42 Once the 
employer produces evidence of such a reason, the sufficiency of the plaintiffs 
prima facie case is no longer at issue.43 At that point, the only pertinent issue is 
the "ultimate question" of discrimination: 
when the defendant fails to persuade the district court to dismiss the action for 
lack of a prima facie case, and responds to the plaintiffs proof by offering 
evidence of the reason for the plaintiffs rejection, the fact finder must then 
decide whether the rejection was discriminatory within the meaning of Title 
VII.44 
The Aikens court thus concluded that it becomes irrelevant whether the 
plaintiff proved his prima facie case once the employer produces evidence of a 
reason for its action. The Court reemphasized this conclusion succinctly in its 
holding: "[ w ]here the defendant has done everything that would be required of 
him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the 
plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant.'.45 The Court held that the district 
court erred in "focus[ing] on the question of prima facie case rather than 
directly on the question of discrimination.'.46 Finally, the Court remanded the 
case to the district court with instructions to move beyond the issue of the 
prima facie case and "decide on the basis of the evidence before it whether the 
Postal Service discriminated against Aikens.'.47 
The most common application of the Aikens rule, at least in published 
opinions, is probably at the appellate level, when circuit courts observe that for 
41. ld. 
42. U.s. Postal Servo Bd. of Govemors V. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,714 (1983). 
43. ld. at 715. 
44. ld. at 714-15. 
45. ld. at 715. 
46. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 717. 
47. ld. at 717. The Aikens court concluded that the district court erroneously required the plaintiff to 
submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent, in light of the Court's earlier holding that '''[the] McDonnell 
Douglas formula does not require direct proof of discrimination.'" See id. at 714 n.3 (quoting In!,1 Bhd. Of 
Teamsters V. United States, 431 U.S. 325, 358 n.44 (1977». Thus, the only new law established in Aikens was 
that the question of whether the plaintiff proved his prima facie case was no longer relevant after the employer 
produced evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged action. 
The Supreme Court in Aikens originally intended to decide broader issues of discrimination law. Professor 
Deborah Malamud, through in-depth research in the papers of the late Justice Thurgood Marshall, discovered 
Aikens memoranda and draft opinions that discussed abandoning the McDonnell Douglas analysis for certain 
types of employer decisions. See Malamud, supra note 3, at 2249-53. When no approach to the broader issues 
was able to gain the support of a majority of Justices, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist circulated an "alternate 
draft." ld. at 2253. Justice Rehnquis!'s draft, which eventually became the Aikens majority decision, decided 
the case on the narrower ground that the "adequacy of the plaintiff's prima facie showing ... was no longer 
relevant in light of the procedural posture of the case." ld. 
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purposes of review it is no longer relevant whether the plaintiff proved its 
prima facie case.48 Most discrimination cases, however, do not reach the 
appellate level. Consequently, the more pertinent issue for most litigants is the 
effect of Aikens at the trial court level. At that level, Aikens limits when and 
how the employer may ask the judge to determine whether the plaintiff has 
proved her prima facie case and to grant dismissal if the plaintiff has not. 
According to Aikens, the judge can consider the sufficiency of the prima facie 
case only before the employer produces evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason 
for the challenged action, because once the employer does so, the adequacy of 
the plaintiffs prima facie case becomes irrelevant.49 
This rule impelled the defendant to challenge the prima facie case early in 
the litigation process, before the defendant had presented any evidence of its 
own. For almost twenty years after Aikens, a defendant in some jurisdictions 
could challenge the plaintiffs prima facie case very early in the litigation 
process through a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure by contending that the plaintiffs complaint "fail[ ed] to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted.,,50 Until 2002, a number of circuit 
courts took the position that a plaintiffs discrimination claim could be 
dismissed if the plaintiff failed to allege in the complaint all the required 
elements of a prima facie case of discrimination.51 As a result, several 
employers successfully persuaded district court judges to dismiss 
discrimination claims, before the employers had produced any evidence of a 
reason for its action, on the ground that the complaints failed to allege a prima 
facie case of discrimination. 52 
The Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Swierkewicz v. Sorema NA. 53 made 
dismissal on these grounds no longer possible. The district court in 
Swierkewicz dismissed the plaintiffs claim because his complaint "had not 
adequately alleged a prima facie case.,,54 The Second Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal by "relying on its settled precedent, which requires a plaintiff in an 
employment discrimination complaint to allege facts constituting a prima facie 
48. See Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 823-24 & n.1O (6th Cir. 2000) (noting Aikens cited 
often in appellate review and listing several circuit court decisions in which court applied Aikens). 
49. U.S. Postal Servo Bd. of Governors V. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,715 (1983). 
50. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)( 6); see also infra note 51 (collecting circuit court decisions in which courts 
affinned Rule 12(b)( 6) dismissals of employment discrimination claims). 
51. See, e.g., Berry v. Sunrise Home Health Care, Inc., 21 Fed. Appx. 284, 284-85 (6th Cir. 2001); Brown 
V. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 709-10 (2d Cir. 1998); Pruitt v. Howard County Sheritrs Dept., No. 95-
1193,1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1266, at * 8-9 (4th Cir. Jan. 31,1996); Chambers v. Wynne Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d 
1214,1215 (8thCir. 1990). 
52. See Suarez v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schs., 123 F. Supp. 883, 889 (W.D.N.C. 2000); Williams v. 
Keezer, No. 87-72350, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17930, at *9-10 (E.D. Mich. Feb. I, 1988); see also supra note 
51 (citing decisions in which appeIlate courts affinned dismissals for failure to allege all prima facie case 
elements). 
53. 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
54. Id. at 509. 
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case of discrimination under the framework" established in McDonnell 
Douglas. 55 The Supreme Court overturned the Second Circuit's decision, 
holding that the "prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas... is an 
evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.,,56 The Supreme Court 
explained that a court could not require a complaint in a discrimination case to 
plead the facts necessary to establish a prima facie case.57 Such a requirement, 
the Court stated, would violate Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, "which provides that a complaint must include only 'a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. ",58 
Under Rule 8(a)(2), a plaintiffs complaint can be required only to "'give the 
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff s claim is and the grounds upon 
which it rests. ",59 The Court found that this "notice pleading" standard was 
"easily satisfie[d]" by the plaintiffs complaint in which he alleged he had been 
fired because of his national origin and his age.60 
After Swierkewicz, an employer cannot attack a plaintiffs prima facie case 
based solely on the pleadings. Any argument that the plaintiff cannot prove a 
prima facie case of discrimination must refer to facts and evidence (or the 
absence of evidence) outside the pleadings. Consequently, a judge would be 
required to treat that argument as a motion for summary judgment rather than a 
motion to dismiss.61 With an employer's challenge to the prima facie case now 
occurring after the "pleadings" stage of the litigation process, such a challenge 
will now most likely occur after the court has required the employer to present 
its nondiscriminatory reasons for its challenged action. 
Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represents one means 
through which the employer might be required to present any reason it will rely 
on to defend its challenged action. Since 1993, Rule 26(a) has required parties 
to make "initial disclosures" early in the litigation process.62 These disclosure 
must include the identity of each individual "likely to have discoverable 
information that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses" 
and the subjects of that information, and copies of documents that the 
disclosing party "may use to support its claims or defenses," among other 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 510. 
57. Swierkewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 
58. Id. at 512 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2». 
59. Id. at 512 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47 (1957». 
60. Id. at 5\3-14. 
61. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), (c). Both rules provide that "[ilf, on a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." !d.; see also J.R. Kemper, 
Annotation, What, Other Than Affidavits, Constitutes "Matters Outside the Pleadings," Which May Convert 
Motion Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure I 2(b), (c) into Motion for Summary Judgment, 2 A.L.R. FED. 
1027 (2002) (collecting cases in which federal courts have converted Rule 12(b) or 12(c) motion to dismiss into 
Rule 56 motion for summary judgment). 
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(I). 
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infonnation.63 In most discrimination cases, the employer's main defense will 
be that it had a nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged action. Therefore, 
the employer's initial disclosures will usually include infonnation and 
documents that identify the alleged reason for its action. 
Even if the employer does not reveal its reason in its Rule 26(a) "initial 
disclosures", the plaintiff can require the employer to produce its reason and 
the evidence supporting it through discovery. If the employer moves for 
summary judgment prior to discovery, the plaintiff can rely on Rule 56(f) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to ask the judge to deny or postpone the 
judgment until the plaintiff can gather additional evidence through discovery.64 
In all likelihood, the judge will not consider the defendant employer's motion 
for summary judgment until after the plaintiff has had a reasonable opportunity 
to conduct discovery.65 Consequently, by the time a court considers an 
employer's motion for summary judgment, the court will have before it 
evidence of the employer's alleged reason for its action.66 
Under these circumstances, one could interpret Aikens to preclude the 
employer from challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiffs prima facie case, 
because the prima facie case becomes "irrelevant" once the employer has 
produced evidence of a reason for its action. Some federal courts, however, 
construed Aikens in a way that permitted courts to grant summary judgment on 
two alternative bases.67 The court could grant summary judgment if the 
defendant demonstrated the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case.68 
Alternatively, even if the plaintiff established a prima facie case, the court 
could grant summary judgment if the employer presented evidence of a 
nondiscriminatory reason for its action that the plaintiff could not genuinely 
dispute.69 In Curry v. E-Systems, Inc.,7o the Fourth Circuit explained this 
63. See FED. R. CIY. P. 26(a)(I)(A), (B). 
64. See FED. R. CIY. P. 56(1) (stating court "may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make 
such other order as is just"). 
65. See. e.g., Chemova v. Elec. Sys. Servs., Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 720, 722 (D. Md. 2003) (granting 
plaintiff continuance under Rule 56(1) to allow plaintiff to conduct discovery); see generally Jean F. Rydstrom, 
Annotation, SUfficiency of Showing. Under Rule 56(j) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Of Inability to 
Present by Affidavit Facts Justifying Opposition to Motionfor Summary Judgment, 47 A.L.R. FED. 206 (2004) 
(collecting Rule 56(1) cases). This collection makes clear that in discrimination and many otber types of cases, 
summary judgment is usually not granted until after tbe plaintiff has had time and an opportunity to conduct 
discovery. 
66. See Malamud, supra note 3, at 2269-71 (discussing avenues through which employer will produce 
evidence of alleged reasons for employment decision). The employer's "early pleadings," answers to 
interrogatories, requests for admissions, and pretrial memoranda, will reveal the alleged reason for its action. 
Seeid. 
67. See Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993) (summarizing "alternative" 
arguments employers can make in summary judgment motion). 
68. !d. 
69. Id. 
70. No. 94-1779,1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 34724 (4tb Cir. Dec. II, 1995) (per curiam). 
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construction of Aikens, and illustrated the procedure that courts should use to 
comply with that decision. 71 
The Curry court held that 
where an employer-defendant as movant has contended both that the claimant's 
submissions fail to establish a prima facie case or, alternatively, to present a 
genuine issue as to the credence of an asserted nondiscriminatory reason, our 
practice (at both levels) [trial and summary judgment] has been to address these 
. d . .. 72 m or er as separate mqUlries. 
In a footnote, the court explained how this approach could be squared with 
Aikens, essentially reasoning that at the summary judgment phase (as 
contrasted with trial) the sufficiency of the plaintiff's prima facie case could 
still be relevant, as long as that issue was decided before the court considered 
the employer's reason.73 Accordingly, the court ended the footnote by 
explaining, "the first logical inquiry is whether the plaintiffs' proffered 
evidence would make out a prima facie case, and hence survive a motion to 
dismiss, before ever getting to any possible 'pretext' issues.,,74 In sum, an 
employer's challenge to a plaintiff's prima facie case could be considered on 
summary judgment as long as the court evaluated that issue separately from, 
and prior to, consideration of the employer's alleged reason for its action. 
Only a mind reader could know whether judges followed the strictures of 
Aikens and duly limited their consideration of the plaintiff's prima facie case 
when considering summary judgment motions in discrimination cases. The 
Reeves decision, however, apparently rendered such restrictions moot. 
C. The Effect of Reeves 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Reeves to resolve a circuit court 
split regarding the correct standard for judgment as a matter of law or summary 
judgment in a discrimination case.75 The split concerned whether a plaintiff in 
a discrimination case could survive summary judgment, and reach a jury, if the 
only evidence she presented was a "prima facie case of discrimination (as 
71. See id. at *7-11. 
72. [d. at *8 (emphasis added). 
73. See id. at *8 n.2. 
74. Curry, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 34724, at *8 n.2. 
75. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 137 (2000). In Reeves. the Court 
reviewed the district court's denial of the employer's motions for judgment as a matter oflaw, made during and 
after the trial under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at 137, 138-39. The standards for 
granting judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 and summary judgment under Rule 56 are essentially the 
same. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). Consequently, lower courts have 
applied Reeves to rulings on summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law motions. See infra Part n.D 
(discussing lower court decisions applying Reeves). 
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defined in McDonnell Douglas) combined with sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation 
for its decision .... ,,76 The Supreme Court held that such evidence could be 
sufficient for a plaintiff to avoid summary judgment because "a plaintiffs 
prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's 
asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the 
employer unlawfully discriminated.,,77 
The Supreme Court immediately added, however, that "[ c ]ertainly there will 
be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and 
set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational 
factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory.,,78 To illustrate, 
the Court highlighted cases in which "the record conclusively revealed some 
other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or ... [in which] 
the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's 
reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent 
evidence that no discrimination had occurred.,,79 
In the next paragraph, the most important of the Reeves case, the Supreme 
Court clarified when summary judgment should be granted in a discrimination 
case. The Court explained, "[ w ]hether judgment as a matter of law is 
appropriate in any particular case will depend on a number of factors.,,80 The 
first factor that the Court listed was "the strength of the plaintiff s prima facie 
case.,,81 The Court then added, as the other factors, "the probative value of the 
proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that 
supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered on a motion 
for judgment as a matter oflaw.,,82 
Later in its decision, the Court applied these factors and the summary 
judgment standard to Reeves's facts. 83 The Court concluded that the plaintiff 
presented sufficient evidence to overcome a summary judgment motion and 
prevail at trial.84 In reaching its conclusion, the Court mentioned three times 
that the plaintiff had proved a prima facie case of discrimination but made no 
76. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 140 (citations omitted). In the lower courts, Reeves has been applied far more 
often to rulings on summary judgment than to rulings in judgment as a matter of law. See infra Part II.D 
(presenting overview of post-Reeves jurisprudence). Therefore, this article will use the term "summary 
judgment" to refer to the procedure for determining whether a plaintiff has sufficient evidence to submit his or 
her discrimination case to the jury. 
77. Id. at 148. 
78. Id. 
79. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 148-49. 
82. Id. at 149. 
83. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 520 U.S. 133, 151-54 (2000) (holding plaintiff offered 
sufficient evidence for jury to find employer intentionally discriminated). 
84. Id. at 151-154. 
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comment on the strength or weakness of that case.85 Additionally, the Court's 
decision relied upon plaintiffs evidence that the employer's reason was 
pretextual.86 The Court did comment on the strength of the pretext evidence, 
stating that the plaintiff "made a substantial showing that respondent's 
explanation was false.,,87 Finally, the Court noted that the plaintiff presented 
"additional evidence of age-based animus," in particular, discriminatory 
remarks by an executive who played a key role in the decision to terminate the 
plaintiff.88 
In Reeves, the Court quoted Aikens three times but never discussed Aiken's 
rulings regarding the prima facie case.89 The Reeves court, however, without 
explicitly acknowledging it was doing so, removed the limits that Aikens placed 
on the relevance of the prima facie case. Aikens held that once the employer 
produced evidence of a reason for its action, the prima facie case was 
irrelevant. Later, lower courts decided that the prima facie case could be 
considered after the employer produced evidence of a reason. Still, courts held 
that the prima facie case should be considered separately from, and prior to, the 
evaluation of the employer's reason. In Reeves, the Supreme Court included 
the prima facie case and evidence regarding the employer's reason as factors 
courts should consider, together, in deciding whether summary judgment was 
appropriate. Moreover, after Reeves, courts may consider not only whether the 
plaintiff proved the prima facie elements, but also the strength of the plaintiff s 
prima facie case. Thus, pre-Reeves, if a court found that a plaintiff proved its 
prima facie case, it had no further reason to consider the elements of that case. 
Post-Reeves, courts are to take a "second look" at the evidence supporting the 
prima facie case, and can decide that such evidence is not "strong" enough for a 
plaintiff to avoid summary judgment. Lower courts have followed Reeves's 
guidance and considered the strength of a plaintiffs prima facie case in 
deciding whether to grant the defendant summary judgment. 
85. See id. at 151-53. 
86. Id. at 151-53. 
87. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 144. 
88. Jd. at 151-53. 
89. Id. at 141, 142, 148. First, the Reeves court quoted Aikens to substantiate its observations that '''the 
question facing triers offact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult,' and that '[t]here will seldom 
be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes .... " Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141 (alteration in 
original) (quoting U.S. Postal Servo Bd. of Governors V. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716). The second quotation 
highlighted that after the employer meets its burden of producing evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for 
its action, the "sole remaining issue [is] 'discrimination vel non ... • Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (quoting U.S. Postal 
Servo Bd. of Governors V. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714). Finally, Reeves referenced Aikens for the proposition 
that "trial courts should not 'treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact.'" Reeves, 
530 U.S. at 148 (quoting St. Mary's Honor etr. V. Hicks. 509 U.S. 502,524 (1993) quoting U.S. Postal Servo 
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716)). 
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D. Post-Reeves Decisions 
Three recent federal district court decisions illustrate how, under Reeves, the 
court can revisit the prima facie case and decide it is not strong enough to allow 
the plaintiff to go to trial even ifthe plaintiff proved the prima facie elements.9o 
Most recently, in Marron, a magistrate judge found in her report and 
recommendations that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of age 
discrimination.91 The district court judge agreed and found that the plaintiff's 
prima facie case was "legally sufficient.,,92 The district court quoted Reeves 
and noted that the "strength of the plaintiffs prima facie case" was a relevant 
factor in deciding if the plaintiffs case should go to trial.93 Next, the court 
found that the plaintiffs prima facie case was "quite weak - indeed, the bare 
minimum required to carry a burden itself frequently described as 'minimal. ",94 
Finally, the court found that the weakness of the plaintiff's prima facie case left 
him with nothing more than "quarrels with some of the explanations" given by 
the employer for its rejection of plaintiff, and this was insufficient for the 
plaintiff to survive summary judgment.95 
Similarly, in Morris, after finding that "the plaintiff ... presented a prima 
facie case of age discrimination, albeit a weak one," the court quoted the 
Reeves factors, including the strength of the prima facie case.96 Applying those 
factors, the court declared the plaintiff's prima facie case and pretext evidence 
to be weak. Therefore, the court granted the defendant's summary judgment 
motion.97 In DeWeese, the court treated the plaintiff in the same fashion. 
Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff satisfied her prima facie burden 
but concluded that her "prima facie case [was] weak. ,,98 Based on the 
weakness of the plaintiff's prima facie case and the other Reeves factors, the 
court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion.99 
In many other cases, federal trial court judges have applied the Reeves 
factors and relied on a weak prima facie case as a basis for dismissing the 
plaintiffs claim. For example, in Gaston v. Home Depot USA, Inc. ,100 a federal 
90. See Marron v. N.Y. City Campaign Fin. Bd., No. 02-5562LAK, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9122, at *5-6 
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2004); Morris v. Charter One Bank, F.S.B., 275 F. Supp. 2d. 249, 257-60 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); 
DeWeese v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 120 F. Supp. 2d 735,751 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
91. Marron, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *1. 
92. Id. at *5. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Marron, 2004 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS, at *5-6. 
96. Morris v. Charter One Bank, F.S.B, 275 F. Supp. 2d 249, 255-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also id. at 256 
(stating "plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case"); id. at 257 (excerpting Reeves factors). 
97. Morris, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 260. 
98. DeWeese v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 120 F. Supp. 2d 735, 751 (S.D. Ind. 2000); see also id. at 748-49 
(concluding presented sufficient evidence to meet her prima facie burden). 
99. Id. at 751. 
100. 129 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
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court in Florida declared the plaintiffs prima facie case "exceedingly weak."IOI 
The Eleventh Circuit requires the plaintiff to show that she was treated "less 
favorably" than similarly situated employees. 102 In Gaston, the persons the 
plaintiff presented as comparators were not sufficiently similar to the 
plaintiff. 103 Therefore, the court held that, under Reeves, the plaintiffs prima 
facie case and evidence of pretext were not strong enough to avoid summary 
judgment. 104 Gaston is just one example of dozens of federal district court 
decisions in which a court granted summary judgment based, at least in part, on 
the Reeves weak prima facie case factor. los 
Circuit courts have also relied on the weak prima facie case factor in 
affirming grants of summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit, for example, in 
two age discrimination cases, applied the Reeves factors and held that the 
plaintiffs "weak" prima facie case supported granting summary judgment for 
the employer. 106 In Dammen, the court assumed that the plaintiff proved the 
elements of his prima facie case, but immediately observed the weakness of the 
fourth prima facie element of his case. 107 The fourth element required the 
plaintiff to show "that, after his discharge, 'the position remained open and the 
employer sought applicants with similar qualifications to fill the position. ",108 
The court concluded that the fourth element of Dammen's case was "weakened 
by uncontroverted evidence offered by UniMed that Dammen's position was 
eliminated upon his termination and re-created later in name only, as the new 
position included duties not held by Dammen prior to his dismissal.,,109 The 
court relied on the weakness of this element in affirming summary judgment 
against Dammen. In particular, the court held that "[e]ven assuming Dammen 
has presented a prima facie case of age discrimination, the weakness of his 
prima facie case and the low probative value of his evidence that UniMed's 
explanation is false convinces us that he has failed to present a submissible case 
f d· . . . ,,110 o age IscnmmatlOn. 
10 I. Id. at 1375. 
102. /d. at 1368 (citing, inter alia, Walkerv. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177. 1193 (11th CiT. 1998». 
1m. /d. at 1368-72. 
104. Gaston, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 1375-76. 
105. See. e.g., McLeod v. Connecticut, No. 03-1397,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21108,at *6-7 (D. Conn. Sept. 
30,2004); Diaz v. Weill Med. College, No. 02-7380, 2004 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 2054, at *52, 83-85 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 13,2004); Burniche v. GE Automation Servs., Inc., 306 F. Supp. 2d 233, 238-40 (N.D.N.Y. 2004); Lester 
v. Natsios, 290 F. Supp. 2d II, :'41-43 (D.D.C. 2003); Robinson v. N.Y. City Health Dep't, No. 00-8969, 2001 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10810, at *26, 27 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2001), affd, No. 04-1489, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13286 (2d 
CiT. June 24,2005); Sheets v. Nat'l Computer Sys., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21657, at *25, 26 (S.D. la. Dec. 7, 
2000). 
106. See Girten v. McRentals, Inc., 337 F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir. 2003); Dammen v. UniMed Med. Ctr., 236 
F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment). 
107. Dammen, 236 F.3d at 981. 
108. /d. (quoting Bashara v. Black Hills Corp., 26 F.3d 820,823 (8th CiT. 1994». 
109. /d. 
110. Id. at 982. 
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The Eighth Circuit used a similar process in Girten. The court again 
assumed that the plaintiff established a prima facie case, but found that "the 
prima facie case [was] not particularly strong."lll As in Dammen, the source of 
the weakness was the "replacement" element, as the court found that "[t]he 
nine year age difference between Mr. Girten and his replacement may not be 
sufficient to infer age discrimination."II2 The court concluded that the 
plaintiffs failed to establish a strong prima facie case and presented virtually no 
evidence of pretext. 1 13 Accordingly, the court held that no reasonable trier of 
fact could conclude that the defendant discriminated on the basis of age and 
affirmed summary judgment. 114 
The Second Circuit relied heavily on the weakness of the plaintiffs prima 
facie case in affirming summary judgment for the employer in Hutchinson v. 
Weiss, Peck & Greer, L.L.c.. 1l5 The court held that, even assuming that the 
employer's stated reason for discharging the plaintiff was pretextual, the 
plaintiff failed the Reeves standard for avoiding summary judgment. 116 The 
court reiterated the Reeves factors, beginning with "'the strength of the prima 
facie case .... ",117 Next, the court found that "Hutchinson's prima facie case 
[was] extremely weak." 1 18 Largely on this basis, the Second Circuit concluded 
that "Hutchinson's prima facie case plus his proof that WPG's reason for his 
termination was pretextual does not provide evidence from which a reasonable 
jury" could find age discrimination. 1 19 
Similar to the Hutchinson court, the court in Wolde-Meskel v. Argus 
Community, Inc. 120 found that, even assuming the plaintiff proved pretext, the 
plaintiff's claim should be dismissed because of a weak prima facie case. The 
Wolde-Meskel court stated that when the plaintiff establishes a weak prima 
facie case, the Reeves decision dictates that the plaintiff must offer more than 
evidence of pretext to avoid summary judgment. The court held, "even if 
Wolde-Meskel's defenses and explanations do create a genuine issue of fact [as 
to credibility of employer's reasons], since his prima facie case is-at best-
weak, Reeves mandates that plaintiff come forward with evidence suggesting 
discrimination and not just the falsity of his employer's proffered reasons.,,121 
In other words, proof of the prima facie case plus evidence of pretext is not 
enough for a plaintiff to get to trial if the court adjudges the prima facie case to 
Ill. Girten, 337 F.3d at 982. 
112. Id. (noting age differences render plaintiffs not similarly situated). 
113. Id. at 983. 
114. Id. 
115. No. 00-7351, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31863 (2d Cir. Dec. 13, 2000). 
116. Id. at *7. 
117. Id. (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. at 148-49). 
118. /d. 
119. Hutchinson, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31863, at *7-8. 
120. No. 99-10112, 2001 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 11261 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7,2001). 
121. Id. at *28. 
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be "weak." 
Courts do not always identify their bases for judgments. For example, in 
Selph v. Farmer Bros., Co. 122, the Ninth Circuit, without explanation, held that 
the plaintiffs prima facie case was weak. Later, citing the Reeves factors, the 
court concluded, "[c]onsidering the strength of Selph's prima facie case, which 
was weak, the limited probative value of the proof that his employer's 
explanation was false, and other evidence that supports the employer's case, the 
district court correctly determined that Farmer Brothers was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.,,123 The Selph court did not explain which factors 
were most important to its conclusion that the employer was entitled to 
summary judgment. 
A few courts have relied on a plaintiff's "strong" prima facie case as a basis 
for denying an employer's motion for summary judgment. For example, in 
EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & CO.,.24 the Fourth Circuit noted, while discussing 
the prima facie stage of the analysis, that "the prima facie case here is a strong 
one.,,125 The court later held that, under Reeves, this "strong prima facie case 
of national origin discrimination" along with "ample evidence to discredit" the 
employer's proffered reasons for rejecting the plaintiff, was sufficient to permit 
the trier of fact to infer discrimination, and therefore sufficient "to entitle a 
plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment.,,126 The Ninth Circuit, in 
Chuang v. University of California,127 held that "the evidence constituting 
[plaintiff's] prima facie case is sufficiently strong to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the truth of [employer's] proffered non-discriminatory 
reasons.,,128 By tying the strength of the plaintiffs prima facie case evidence to 
the amount of evidence needed to create an issue of fact as to the employer's 
reason, the Chuang court applied almost a "sliding scale" approach in which a 
strong prima facie case could lessen the evidence of pretext required to get to 
trial. I29 In other cases, courts have referred back to the plaintiff's prima facie 
case when discussing whether the employer's proffered reason for its action 
was pretextual. I30 In these cases, however, the courts looked back not at the 
prima facie case per se, but at some of the evidence the plaintiff presented to 
122. 56 Fed. Appx. 399 (9th Cir. 2003). 
123. ld. at 400. 
124. 243 F.3d 846 (4th Cir. 2001). 
125. ld. at 851. 
126. ld. at 854. 
127. 225 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2000). 
128. Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1127. The court here particularly pointed to the plaintiff's "extraordinary 
qualifications." ld. 
129. Compare id. at 1127-28 (holding plaintiff made sufficiently strong prima facie case to raise genuine 
issue of material fact regarding falsity of employer's reason), with Wolde-Meskel v. Argus Cmty., Inc., No. 99-
10112, 2001 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 11261, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2001) (holding plaintiff must present 
additional evidence of discrimination, not just pretext, if prima facie case is weak). 
130. See Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 582 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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prove the prima facie case. The court considered such evidence (e.g., 
plaintiffs qualifications) because it related to the employer's reason for its 
action (e.g., the plaintiff was unqualified). 131 
III. "STRENGTH OF THE PRIMA FACIE CASE": WHAT DOES IT MEAN? 
Federal circuit and district courts already apply the Supreme Court's ruling 
in Reeves that "the strength of the plaintiffs prima facie case" is one of the 
main factors courts should consider in deciding whether a discrimination 
plaintiff should survive a motion for summary judgment or judgment as a 
matter of law. To date, however, lower courts have not seriously examined the 
meaning of that factor. Consequently, many significant questions remain 
regarding the meaning behind the term "strength of the prime facie case." 
On closer review, the meaning of the term "strength of the prime facie case" 
breaks down into a set of two sub-questions: (1) What is the meaning of the 
tenn "prima facie case?", and (2) what are the bases for judging that a prima 
facie case is "strong" or "weak"? 
A. Meaning of "Prima Facie Case" 
In Reeves, the Supreme Court stated that the phrase "prima facie case" had 
the same meaning as the definition the Court had established in McDonnell 
Douglas. 132 Thus, McDonnell Douglas serves as the logical starting point for 
ascertaining the meaning of the term "prima facie case" in Reeves. 
The Reeves opinion stated that page 802 of McDonnell Douglas "defined" 
prima facie case. On page 802 of McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court 
held: 
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the 
statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be 
done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and 
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) 
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, 
the position remained open and the emploler continued to seek applicants from 
persons of complainant's qualifications. 13 
Thus, the McDonnell Douglas court defined "prima facie case" in terms of 
particular factual elements that the plaintiff must prove. Importantly, 
131. [d. The distinction between the evidence supporting the prima facie case, and the prima facie case as 
an integrated factor whose overall "strength" or "weakness" of the court considers as a whole, is discussed 
more fully at infra notes 221-225 and accompanying text. 
132. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 140 (2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). 
133. McDonnell Douglas, 41 I U.S. at 802. 
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McDonnell Douglas includes a footnote stating, "[t]he facts necessarily will 
vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof 
required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to 
differing factual situations.,,134 In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has 
reaffirmed that courts must avoid "inflexib[ility]" when deciding whether a 
plaintiff has proven the elements required to establish a prima facie case. 135 
Nevertheless, most courts, including the Supreme Court, describe the prima 
facie case in terms of standard factual elements the plaintiff must prove. For 
example, in Reeves, the Supreme Court determined the plaintiff had proven a 
prima facie case by satisfying a checklist of elements: 
It is undisputed that petitioner satisfied this [prima facie] burden here: (i) at the 
time he was fired, he was a member of the class protected by the ADEA 
("individuals who are at least 40 years of age; (ii) he was otherwise qualified 
for the position of Hinge Room supervisor, (iii) he was discharged by 
respondent, and (iv) respondent successively hired three persons in their thirties 
fill 
. . , .. 136 to I petItIOner s pOSItIon. 
The Reeves approach exemplifies the typical approach in intentional 
discrimination cases to defining the prima facie case. The Supreme Court 
consistently evaluates a plaintiffs prima facie case by listing standard factual 
elements that the plaintiff has or has not proven. 137 
Since McDonnell Douglas, lower federal courts have almost always defined 
the prima facie case in terms of standard factual elements that the plaintiff must 
134. ld. at 802 n.13. 
135. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (stating "[g]iven that the prima 
facie case operates as a flexible evidentiary standard, it should not be transposed into a rigid pleading standard 
for discrimination cases"); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6 (1981) 
(acknowledging "[i]n McDonnell Douglas, we described an appropriate model for a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination ... We added, however, that this standard is not inflexible .... "); Fumco Constr. Corp. v. 
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576-77 (1978) (cautioning courts to avoid inflexibility when applying McDonnell 
Douglas framework). 
136. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (citation omitted). 
137. See, e.g., SI. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (holding respondent satisfied 
minimal requirements of prima facie case by proving that (I) he is black, (2) he was qualified for the position 
of shift commander, (3) he was demoted from that position and ultimately discharged, and (4) the position 
remained open and was ultimately filled by a white man); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 
186-87 (1989) (requiring petitioner to "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for and was 
qualified for an available position, that she was rejected, and that after she was rejected respondent either 
continued to seek applicants for the position, or, as is alleged here, filled the position with a white employee"); 
Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978) (concluding respondents carried initial prima facie 
burden "by proving they were members of a racial minority; they.did everything within their power to apply for 
employment; Fumco has conceded that they were qualified in every respect for the jobs which were about to be 
open; they were not offered employment, although Smith later was; and the employer continued to seek persons 
of similar qualifications"). 
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prove. 138 In the years since Reeves, courts have continued to apply their 
circuit's standard elements in assessing whether a plaintiff has established a 
prima facie case of discrimination. In hiring cases, the First,139 Third,140 
Fifth,141 Eighth,142 Ninth/43 Tenth,l44 and Eleventh 145 Circuits require a 
plaintiff to prove the exact elements identified in McDonnell Douglas in order 
to establish her prima facie case. The other circuits require the first three 
elements, but vary on the fourth. The Seventh Circuit requires that the person 
hired instead of the plaintiff be outside the plaintiffs protected class or that the 
position remain vacant. 146 The Sixth Circuit requires that the plaintiff show 
that she was treated differently than similarly situated persons outside her 
protected class. 147 The Second and Fourth Circuits impose a more demanding 
fourth element and call for plaintiffs to demonstrate that their rejections 
occurred "under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.,,148 
In cases alleging discriminatory termination, all the circuits have adopted 
standard elements that a plaintiff must prove to make a prima facie showing, 
but there is considerable variation among the circuits regarding the specific 
required elements. All the circuits include in the standard elements that the 
plaintiff was in a protected class and was in fact terminated. Circuits differ 
regarding the "qualification" element. The Third,149 Fifth,150 Sixth,151 Ninth,152 
Tenth,153 and Eleventh l54 Circuits list as their second element that the plaintiff 
was "qualified" for her position. The Fourth,155 Seventh,156 and Eighthl57 
138. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 714-15, 847-52 
(3d ed. 1996). The book identifies several cases that set forth and apply their circuits' standard elements for a 
prima facie case of hiring discrimination. See id. at 714-15. The book similarly explains the standard elements 
of a prima facie case of discriminatory tennination. See id. at 847-52. 
139. See Gu v. Boston Police Dep't, 312 F.3d 6, II (1st Cir. 2002). 
140. See Dorsey v. Pittsburgh Assocs., 90 Fed. Appx. 636, 638 (3d Cir. 2004); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 
759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994). 
141. See Marks v. St. Landry Parish Sch. Bd., 75 Fed. Appx. 233, 234 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). 
142. See Kenney v. Swift Transp., Inc., 347 F.3d 1041, 1044-1045 (8th Cir. 2003). 
143. See Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 323 F.3d 1185, 1193 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002). 
144. See Garcia v. Pueblo Country Club, 299 F.3d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 2002). 
145. See EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 2002). 
146. See Cooper v. Murphysboro Bd. of Educ., 6 Fed. Appx. 438, 440 (7th Cir. 2001). The "outside the 
protected class" requirement compels, for example, a female plaintiff to show the employer hired a male or a 
minority plaintiff to show that the employer hired a Caucasian. 
147. See Miller v. Aladdin Temp-Rite, L.L.c., 72 Fed. Appx. 378, 380 (6th Cir. 2003). 
148. See Williams v. R.H. Donnelley, Corp., 368 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2004); Mackey v. Shalala, 360 
F.3d 463, 468 (4th Cir. 2004). 
149. See Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 318 (3rd Cir. 2000). 
150. See Wooten v. St. Francis Medical Ctr., 108 Fed. Appx. 888,890 (5th Cir. 2004). 
151. See Succarde v. Fed. Express Corp., 106 Fed. Appx. 335, 339 (6th Cir. 2004). 
152. See Bodett v. Coxcom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 743 (9th Cir. 2004). 
153. See Rivera v. City & County of Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 920 (10th Cir. 2004). 
154. See Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. ofEduc., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004). 
155. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004). 
156. See Davis v. Con-Way Transp. Cent. Express, Inc. 368 F.3d 776, 784 (7th Cir. 2004). 
157. See Wheeler v. Aventis Phann., 360 F.3d 853, 857 (8th Cir. 2004). 
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Circuits require that the plaintiff show her performance was "meeting her 
employer's legitimate expectations" near the time of her termination. 
Similarly, the Second Circuit requires the plaintiff to show she was 
"performing satisfactori ly. ,,158 
Even greater variation exists regarding the final element in termination 
cases. The Tenth Circuit requires only that a plaintiff show that her job was not 
eliminated after her termination. 159 The First Circuit calls on the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the employer sought a replacement with roughly equivalent 
l'fi . 160 Th F rth l61 d El h l62 C" . . d qua I IcatIOns. e ou an event IrCUIts reqUire a termmate 
plaintiff to show she was replaced by someone outside the protected class. 163 
The Thirdl64 and Seventhl65 Circuits call on the plaintiff to show that similarly 
situated persons who were not members of the plaintiff's protected class were 
treated more favorably. The Secondl66 and Eighthl67 Circuits require the 
plaintiff to prove the termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to 
an inference of discrimination. In the Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits, the final 
element consists of different combinations of the aforementioned requirements 
d d · h . . 168 a opte m ot er CirCUits. 
As these cases demonstrate, courts continue to define the plaintiffs prima 
facie case in terms of standard factual elements that the plaintiff must prove. 
At least one court and two scholars, however, have posited alternative 
conceptions of the meaning behind the Reeves "prima facie case" term. In the 
unpublished decision Carberry v. Monarch Marking Systems, /nc.,169 the Sixth 
Circuit held that "[a] prima facie case of employment discrimination is weak in 
the Reeves sense when, notwithstanding the failure of the defendant's proffered 
158. See Duncan v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 45 Fed. Appx. 14, 15-16 (2d Cir. 2002). 
159. See Rivera v. City & County of Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 920 (lOth Cir. 2004). 
160. See Benoit v. Technical Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166, 173 (1st Cir. 2003). 
161. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004). 
162. See Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004). 
163. See O'Connor v. Conso\. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311-13 (1996) (modifying 
"replacement" element to suit ADEA context). In age discrimination cases, the "replacement" element must be 
modified because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that an age discrimination plaintiff is not required to prove 
that his or her replacement was under age forty. Id. Consequently, in age discrimination cases, the Fourth and 
Eleventh Circuit's require a plaintiff to prove her replacement was outside the protected class or "significantly 
younger" than the plaintiff. See Smith v. United Refrigeration, Inc., 47 Fed. Appx. 674, 675 (4th Cir. 2002); 
Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (I Ith Cir. 2000). 
164. See Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 319 (3rd Cir. 2000). 
165. See Davis v. Con-Way Transp. Cent. Express, Inc., 368 F.3d 776, 784 (7th Cir. 2004). 
166. See Duncan v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 45 Fed. Appx. 14, 16 (2d Cir. 2002). 
167. See Wheeler v. Aventis Pharm., 360 F.3d 853, 857 (8th Cir. 2004). 
168. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits require that the plaintiff show either that she replaced by someone outside 
the protected class or that she was treated less favorably than a person outside the protected class. See Wooten 
v. St. Francis Medical Ctr., 108 Fed. Appx. 888, 890 (5th Cir. 2004); Succarde v. Fed. Express Corp., 106 Fed. 
Appx. 335, 339 (6th Cir. 2004). The Ninth requires that the plaintiff show that similarly situated individuals 
outside the protected class were treated more favorably, or that other circumstances surrounding the termination 
give rise to an inference of discrimination. See Bodett v. Coxcom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 743 (9th Cir. 2004). 
169. 30 Fed. Appx. 389 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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explanation, 'the record conclusively reveals some other, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the employer's decision .... ",\70 In an article discussing Reeves, 
Professor Michael Zimmer suggested that Justice O'Connor's majority opinion 
"may ... be using the term 'prima facie case' in the more general sense of the 
ultimate burden the plaintiff has to prove that she was a victim of defendant's 
discrimination.,,171 
Professor Henry Chambers discussed the possibility of a broader meaning of 
"prima facie case" in an article published one year after Reeves. l72 Professor 
Chambers argued for a broader definition of prima facie case than the 
"checklist of facts" definition typically applied. He explained that "[t]he prima 
facie case can be constructed in at least two ways - as a checklist of facts that 
appear relevant to discrimination or as a set of facts aimed directly at 
supporting an inference of discrimination.,,173 Professor Chambers 
acknowledged that "the McDonnell Douglas Court's listing of specific facts 
that would suffice to prove a prima facie case in that factual setting might lead 
one to view the prima facie case as a checklist.,,174 Still, he maintained that 
"the appropriate way to view the prima facie case is as a set of facts that creates 
an inference of discrimination.,,175 According to Professor Chambers, the term 
"prima facie case" should be understood to mean "any set of facts sufficient to 
support an inference of discrimination. ,,176 
In Reeves and earlier Supreme Court discrimination decisions, there is 
support for either the argument that "prima facie case" means a "checklist" of 
standard elements, or the argument that it has the broader meaning of all the 
facts supporting the plaintiffs claim of discrimination. The Reeves court's 
statement that it meant the prima facie case "as defined in McDonnell 
Douglas," and its citation of the particular page of the McDonnell Douglas 
opinion on which the Court set forth the list of standard elements of a prima 
facie case of hiring discrimination support the checklist definition. 177 In 
addition, the Court evaluated the standard elements of a prima facie case of 
discriminatory discharge to reach its conclusion that Reeves proved a prima 
170. ld. at 394 (emphasis in original) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 
148 (2000)). 
171. Michael Zimmer, Leading By Example: An Holistic Approach to Individual Disparate Treatment 
Law, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 177, 186 n.49 (2001) [hereinafter Zimmer, Leading]. 
172. See Henry Chambers, Discrimination, Plain and Simple, 36 TULSA L.J. 557, 566-67 (2001) 
[hereinafter Chambers, Discrimination]. 
173. Id. 
174. ld. at 567. 
175. Id. Professor Chambers added, "[i]ndeed, that has been a vision attributed to the McDonnell Douglas 
test." Id. at 567. 
176. Chambers, Discrimination, supra note 172, at 559. See also id. at 567 ("Courts viewing the prima 
facie case as any set of facts that supports an inference of discrimination have taken various paths to guarantee 
that the prima facie case does support an inference of discrimination. "). 
177. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 140 (2000). 
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facie case.178 Moreover, Reeves lists the "strength of the prima facie case" 
factor separately from "the probative value of the proof that the employer's 
explanation is false" factor. 179 If "prima facie case" meant all the evidence 
supporting an inference of discrimination, then the identification of evidence of 
pretext as a factor would be redundant. Finally, the Court in Reeves 
specifically found that evidence of the employer's false explanation is a "form 
of circumstantial evidence" that supports an inference of discrimination. ISO 
In Burdine, a case on which the Reeves court repeatedly relied, the Supreme 
Court considered-and rejected-the position that the McDonnell Douglas 
"prima facie case" meant all evidence supporting an inference of 
discrimination. lSI The Burdine court explained, 
[t]he phrase "prima facie case" not only may denote the establishment of a 
legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption, but also may be used by courts to 
describe the plaintiffs burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier 
of fact to infer the fact at issue. McDonnell Douglas should have made it 
apparent that in the Title VII context we use "prima facie case" in the former 
182 sense. 
The "latter sense," which the Court rejected, more closely resembles the 
meaning of "prima facie case" suggested by Professors Zimmer and Chambers. 
Thus, if "prima facie case" in Reeves means all evidence supporting the 
plaintiffs case, then the meaning of the term has changed, at least to some 
degree, since Burdine. 
Alternatively, there are also grounds for finding that the term "prima facie 
case," as used in Reeves, has a broad meaning. In the Reeves list of summary 
judgment factors, if "plaintiff's prima facie case" does not mean all evidence 
supporting the plaintiff's claim, then there is an imbalance in that standard to 
the detriment of plaintiffs. The other factors in the list are "the probative value 
of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence 
that supports the employer's case .... ,,183 The obvious counterbalance to the 
last factor would be "any evidence that supports the plaintiffs case," yet that is 
not mentioned. If the Supreme Court had intended to exclude some of the 
plaintiffs evidence from consideration on summary judgment, while allowing 
and even requiring consideration of all of the employer's evidence, then one 
would expect the Court to explain this disparity. Instead, the Court failed to 
178. See id. at 142 
179. See id. at 148-49. 
180. Id. at 147-48. 
181. See Tex. Dep't ofCmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981); see also Reeves, 530 U.S. 
at 142-43 (citing and quoting Burdine). 
182. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n. 7 (citation omitted). 
183. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000). 
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address the disparity. Perhaps the tenn "prima facie case" meant all the 
evidence supporting the plaintiff's claim, and thus no disparity actually existed. 
Courts should not interpret "prima facie case" to mean "checklist of facts" 
because such an interpretation conflicts with the Aikens decision. 184 
Additionally, basing a summary judgment detennination on the strength or 
weakness of the standard elements of a plaintiffs prima facie case is neither 
logical nor workable for most discrimination cases. 
B. Meaning of "Strong" (or "Weak'') Prima Facie Case 
If the prima facie case is defined as a checklist of factual elements, then it 
will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for courts to develop consistent or 
sensible standards for judging whether a prima facie case is "weak" or 
"strong." One major reason for this difficulty is that in the decades since 
McDonnell Douglas, courts have adopted numerous exceptions to and 
variations on the elements a plaintiff must prove to establish a prima facie case. 
For each exception or variation, courts will now have to decide. what effect it 
has on the "strength" of the plaintiffs prima facie case. 
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court required the plaintiff to show 
that he applied for and was qualified for a position for which the employer was 
seeking applicants. 18s Lower courts have adopted exceptions to both the 
"applied" and "qualified" elements. Courts have held that if an employer did 
not publicize a vacancy, then the plaintiff is not required to show that he or she 
applied for the position.1 86 Moreover, courts have announced that a plaintiffs 
"failure to fonnally apply for a job opening will not bar a Title VII plaintiff 
from establishing a prima facie claim of discriminatory hiring, as long as the 
plaintiff made every reasonable attempt to convey his interest in the job to the 
employer.,,187 
Several courts have similarly decided that, under some circumstances, a 
plaintiff can establish a prima facie case even if she fails to meet the stated 
qualifications for a job. In Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment,188 
the Eleventh Circuit reversed a district court grant of summary judgment to the 
employer. 189 The district court had detennined that the plaintiffs prima facie 
case failed because he lacked a "clinical experience" requirement that the 
184. See infra Part IV (discussing potential conflict between Reeves and Aikens decisions if courts adopt 
"checklist" definition of prima facie case). 
185. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
186. See. e.g., Williams v. Giant Food, Inc., 370 F.3d 423,431 (4th Cir. 2004); Mauro v. S. New England 
Telecomms., Inc., 208 F.3d 384,387 (2d Cir. 2000); Carmichael v. Binningham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 
1133-34 (I IIh Cir. 1984). 
187. EEOC v. Metal Servo Co., 892 F.2d 341,348 (3d Cir. 1990). Metal Servo Co. cites several failure to 
promote and failure to hire cases in which the deciding court adopted an exception to the "applied" element. 
[d. 
188. 132 F.3d 635 (11th Cir. 1998). 
189. [d. at 637. 
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employer stated for the job.190 In reversing the district court, the Eleventh 
Circuit highlighted that the eventual hiree also failed the requirement. 191 In a 
promotion case, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court had erred in 
holding that the plaintiffs failure of an employer-required test meant that 
plaintiff failed the prima facie case, because other employees had been 
promoted without passing the test. 192 The Fifth Circuit has contended that these 
and other cases establish that plaintiffs do not have to prove they met a job's 
stated qualifications if plaintiffs show that the persons hired also failed to meet 
the qualifications. 193 
Plaintiffs who fail the "application" and "qualification" elements have been 
able to rely on these and other exceptions to avoid dismissal of their case on the 
grounds of failure to prove a prima facie case. After Reeves, however, proof of 
the prima facie case is not the end of the matter, because the court must also 
consider the prima facie case's relative strength. Reeves makes relevant the 
question, do these judicially created exceptions affect the strength of the 
plaintiff's prima facie case? Put another way, are cases in which the plaintiff 
can prove the standard elements of a prima facie case "stronger" than those in 
which the plaintiff must rely on a judicially-created exception to one of those 
elements? There may not be a single answer to that question. Courts could 
decide that failure to satisfy the "application" element does not weaken the 
plaintiffs prima facie case, while failure to meet a stated qualification does. 
With some standard elements of a prima facie case, the question becomes 
even more complicated. Many circuits demand that a termination, hiring, or 
promotion discrimination plaintiff show that the individual hired into the 
relevant position is outside the protected class. 194 Courts have also created 
exceptions to this element. These exceptions require one to again consider 
whether reliance on an exception weakens the plaintiffs prima facie case. One 
relevant exception permits a plaintiff to satisfy her prima facie case, even if her 
replacement is of the same sex, race, national origin, etc., if she presents 
evidence the employer hired a replacement with the same characteristics as 
plaintiff to "cover up" discrimination. 195 A forceful argument can be made that 
the presence of this sort of "cover up" evidence actually strengthens the 
plaintiffs discrimination claim. Thus, should courts recognize that plaintiffs 
190. Id. at 643. 
191. Id. 
192. See Sledge v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires N. Am., Ltd., 275 F.3d 1014, 1015-18 (I Ith CiT. 2001). 
193. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 351 F.3d 616, 623-25 (5th Cir. 2003). 
194. See supra notes 161-165 and accompanying text (identifying circuits requiring, as an element, 
replacement by individual outside plaintiff's protected class). See generally Marla Swartz, Note, The 
Replacement Dilemma: An Argument for Eliminating a Non-Class Replacement Requirement in the Prima 
Facie Stage of Title VII Individual Disparate Treatment Discrimination Claims, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1338 
(2003). 
195. See Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905-06 (4th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Western Geophysical Co., 669 
F.2d 280, 284-85 (5th CiT. 1982). 
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who fail the standard replacement element, but show they may fall within the 
"cover up" exception, have "stronger" prima facie cases than plaintiffs who 
meet the standard replacement element? 
The replacement element generates an even more difficult question in age 
discrimination cases. The Supreme Court established, in 0 'Connor, that an age 
discrimination claimant is not required to prove that he or she was replaced by 
someone outside the protected class, that is, under the age of 40.196 0 'Connor 
also held, however, that age discrimination could not be proven when the 
plaintiff was replaced by an employee who was "insignificantly younger.,,197 
Since 0 'Connor, lower courts have struggled to define what constitutes a 
"significant" age difference between the plaintiff and the replacement. 198 The 
Reeves standard now adds another layer of complication to an already 
confusing situation. After Reeves, even if a court finds a "significant" age 
difference, the court must also ask whether that difference indicates a "weak" 
or "strong" prima facie case. Even for significant age differences, courts may 
eventually establish yet another distinction by differentiating between 
"significant but weak" and "significant and strong." If courts adopt this 
distinction, age discrimination cases would become more complex and difficult 
for plaintiffs to prove. 
Certain courts have not only created exceptions to the standard elements of 
the prima facie case, but also established alternative elements to apply in 
certain situations. 199 Courts will now have to decide how to apply the Reeves 
standard in cases involving such alternate elements. One controversial example 
is the "reverse discrimination" case. Courts have established that plaintiffs who 
cannot prove the standard "protected class" element of a prima facie case, such 
as Caucasian males, can nonetheless make a prima facie case of discrimination 
by proving an alternative element.2oo For example, such plaintiffs may present 
evidence of "background circumstances" that suggest that "the defendant is the 
unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.,,201 The application 
of the "protected class" element in cases of alleged reverse discrimination has 
produced conflicting decisions by COurtS,202 and due to the highly charged 
196. O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.s. 308, 311-12 (1996). 
197. /d. at 312-13. 
198. See Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 336-40 (6th Cir. 2003) (summarizing variety of 
judicial definitions of "significant" age difference); see generally Kurt Schaub, The "Substantially Younger" 
Requirement in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.: Will ADEA Plaintiffs Lose Again?, 16 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 225 (1998) (criticizing "significant age difference" requirement). 
199. See, e.g., Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1417-18 (4th Cir. 1991) (discussing alternatives to 
usual prima facie elements when case involves a reduction-in-force); Moore v. City of Charlotte, 754 F.2d 
1100, 1105-06 (4th Cir. 1985) (identifYing variations on the prima facie elements in cases of disciplinary 
decisions); Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (explaining alternative 
to "plaintiff is in a protected class" element). 
200. Parker, 652 F .2d at 10 17. 
201. See id. 
202. See generally Brenda D. DiLuigi, Note, The Notari Alternative: A Better Approach to the Square-
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nature of reverse discrimination, intense public controversy?03 The Reeves 
standard will likely pour fuel on these flames. Courts must now decide whether 
a prima facie case of reverse discrimination is relatively strong, because it 
requires more evidence from a plaintiff than a standard case, or relatively weak, 
because an alternative element can never be as probative as the traditional 
"protected class" element. Either course would be strongly criticized, and 
disagreement and uncertainty will likely emerge on this issue. 
Even in cases where no variations or exceptions apply, and the plaintiff 
proves the traditional elements of a prima facie case, the Reeves standard 
generates difficult questions. For each prima facie element, courts will have to 
determine the quantum of evidence sufficient to support a "strong" prima facie 
case. This will not always be a straightforward matter of, the more evidence 
the better. Take, for example, the element of qualification in hiring and 
promotion cases. In some decisions, courts have held that when a plaintiff has 
qualifications that far exceed those minimally required for the position that 
supports findiQg a "strong" prima facie case under the Reeves standard.204 By 
contrast, other courts have held that qualifications exceeding the requirements 
for the position make the plaintiff "overqualified" and weaken or negate the 
plaintiffs prima facie case.205 
In sum, courts will confront a myriad of difficult and troubling questions as 
they try to define the meaning of "strength of the prima facie case" under the 
Reeves standard, especially if "prima facie case" is defined as a "checklist of 
facts" as in McDonnell Doug/as. More importantly, courts have virtually no 
guidance in addressing these questions or in defining "strong" or "weak" prima 
facie case. The Reeves court failed to explain the meaning of this factor and 
did not apply it to the facts of the case. Although courts similarly lack 
guidance regarding the other two Reeves factors-"the probative value of the 
proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that 
supports the employer's case"-their meaning is more readily understood, if 
not self-evident.206 Whether evidence indicates the falsity of an employer's 
Peg-Round-Hole Problem Found in Reverse Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 353 (1998) (discussing 
conflict among courts regarding definition of elements of prima facie reverse discrimination case). 
203. See generally e. christi cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I: The Myth of the Protected Class 
in Title VI! Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REv. 441 (1998); Timothy K. Giordano, Comment, 
Different Treatment for Non-Minority Plaintiffs under Title VII: A Call for Modification of the Background 
Circumstances Test to Ensure that Separate is Equal, 49 EMORY LJ. 993 (2000); Darren D. McClain, 
Comment, Racial Discrimination against the Majority in Hiring Practices: Courts' Misguided Attempts to 
Make Race-Conscious Law Color Blind, 30 STETSON L. REv. 755 (2000); Susan C. Thies, Comment, Mills v. 
Health Care Service Corporation: Are "Background Circumstances" Too Much to Ask of a Plaintiff Alleging 
Reverse Discrimination in Employment?, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 537 (2000) (illustrating the range of public 
opinion on reverse discrimination). 
204. See EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 851-52 (4th Cir. 2001). 
205. See Rodgers v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., No. 93-4073, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4582, at °11 (E.D. 
Pa. April 12, 1994). 
206. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.s. 133, 149 (2000). 
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reason or discriminatory motive will either be obvious or determinable by 
widely accepted principles of logic or common sense. By contrast, the only 
limit on a court's judgment of whether a prima facie case is "strong" or "weak" 
is that court's own sense of what those terms mean. With so many unresolved 
issues regarding the definition of "strength of the prima facie case" and so little 
direction on how courts should address those issues, the judicial resolutions of 
those questions will likely be widely divergent and frequently arbitrary, and 
hence confusing and unfair. Therefore, it would be advisable for courts to 
adopt a new interpretation of Reeves, in which the term "prima facie case" is 
understood to mean something other than the checklist of factual elements set 
forth in McDonnell Douglas. 
IV. PREVENTING THE POP-UP: RECONCILING AIKENS AND REEVES By 
LIMITING THE ROLE OF THE PRIMA FACIE CASE 
If the term "prima facie case" has the same meaning in the Supreme Court's 
decisions in Aikens and Reeves, then those two decisions conflict. Aikens held 
that once the employer produced evidence of a reason for its action, the 
plaintiffs prima facie case is no longer relevant and should not be considered 
by the court.207 Conversely, Reeves lists "strength of the prima facie case" as 
one of the factors courts should consider even after the employer has produced 
evidence of a reason (indeed, along with the evidence regarding the employer's 
reason) when ruling on motions for summary judgment or judgment as a matter 
ofa law. 
Some courts have interpreted Aikens in a narrow way that avoids the conflict 
with Reeves. These courts held that Aikens makes the prima facie case 
irrelevant only after the case is "fully tried on the merits.,,208 In one 
particularly striking case, Teneyck v. Omni Shoreham Hotel,209 the D.C. Circuit 
affirmed the district court's dismissal of a hiring discrimination case because 
the plaintiff failed to prove that the employer had continued to hire applicants 
for the same position, a prima facie element.210 The court dismissed the claim 
despite witness testimony that such hiring had occurred.2l1 The D.C. Circuit 
distinguished the case from Aikens on the ground that "[Teneyck] was not 'fully 
tried on the merits. ",212 In at least two decisions, Judge Donald Nugent of the 
207. U.s. Postal Servo Bd. ofGovemors V. Aikens, 460 U.s. 711, 715 (1983). 
208. Russell V. McKinney Hosp. Venture, Inc., 235 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Cardenas V. 
AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 994, 998-99 (8th Cir. 2001). 
209. 365 F.3d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
210. Id. at 1154. 
211. Id. 
212. !d. (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714). The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that the "District Court's 
decision to admit [the employer witnesses'] testimony to the record while simultaneously excluding it from 
consideration created a situation that nonnally should be avoided." Id. Despite this acknowledgement, the 
D.C. Circuit upheld the district court's decision because it allowed the employer witness's testimony to deal 
with the "logistical difficulty" of the future unavailability of that witness, and the plaintiff failed to object to the 
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United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio adopted an even 
narrower construction of Aikens. He held that Aikens restricted only what 
courts could do after a bench trial, and even then only when the court had 
denied a defendant's motion for directed verdict.213 In Petrone and Campbell, 
he stated, "Aikens... concluded that the district court could not revisit 
whether or not the plaintiffs had proven a prima facie case in a bench trial after 
previously concluding, at the close of the plaintiffs' case in chief, that the prima 
facie case had been made.,,214 
The Sixth Circuit, in Kovacevich, correctly overruled Judge Nugent's line of 
cases. The Kovacevich court based its decision on a more careful reading of 
Aikens. The Sixth Circuit explained, "[b]oth its holding and language 
demonstrate that Aikens is not a narrow case, as the district court assumes ... 
Aikens was not limited to bench trials following a judge's rejection of a 
directed verdict motion, as the district court has suggested elsewhere.,,215 The 
court acknowledged that Aikens involved a bench trial and a district court's 
denial of the defendant's motion for directed verdict, but pointed out that "the 
Court made no effort to narrow its discussion to that procedural 
circumstance.,,216 Instead, the Sixth Circuit observed, "when discussing the 
role of the prima facie case, the Aikens Court spoke broadly, stating 
unconditionally that district judges should not revisit a prima facie case once a 
defendant has presented evidence of its nondiscriminatory reason and the case 
has been tried on the merits.,,217 
The Kovacevich court correctly described Aikens as a broad decision,z18 Its 
statement that Aikens held that the prima facie case should not be revisited after 
the employer produced its reason and "the case has been tried on the merits", 
however, interpreted Aikens too narrowly. Kovacevich focused on the Supreme 
Court's statement in Aikens that "[b]ecause this case was fully tried on the 
merits, it is surprising to find the parties and the Court of Appeals still 
addressing the question whether Aikens made out a prima facie case.,,219 The 
procedure. Id. 
213. See Petrone v. Cleveland State Univ., 993 F. Supp. 1119, 1130 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Coleman v. Toys 
"Roo Us, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 713, 719 (N.D. Ohio 1997). 
214. Petrone, 993 F. Supp. at 1130; Campbell, 976 F. Supp. at 719. 
215. Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 823 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Petrone, 993 F. Supp. at 
1130). 
216. Id. 
217. Id. (citing U.S. Postal Servo Bd. of Governors V. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983». 
218. See Kovacevich, 224 F.3d at 823 (acknowledging broad and unconditional instructions Aikens 
provides to district court judges regarding consideration of prima facie case). . 
219. U.S. Postal Servo Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-14 (1983), quoted in Kovacevich, 
224 F.3d at 824. In his concurring opinion in Kovacevich, Judge Ronald Lee Gilman contended that the 
majority's rationale was "rooted in the Supreme Court's observation in Aikens that "following final judgment 
for the defendant in a Title VIJ case after a bench trial, it was 'surprising to find the parties and the Court of 
Appeals still addressing the question whether [the] plaintiff made out a prima facie case.'" Kovacevich, 224 
F.3d at 836 (J. Gilman, concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 713-14). 
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more important declaration in Aikens, however, was the holding that "[w]here 
the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff 
had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is 
no longer relevant. Aikens thus held that the plaintiff's prima facie case 
becomes irrelevant once the employer has produced evidence of a 
nondiscriminatory reason for its action, which usually occurs long before a full 
trial is completed. 
In Aikens, the Supreme Court offered crucial insight into the role of the 
prima facie case in the McDonnell Douglas analysis. The Court recognized 
that the prima facie case had no relevance once the employer produced 
evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Prior to the employer's 
production of a reason, as the Supreme Court stated in Burdine, "[t]he prima 
facie case serves an important function in the litigation: it eliminates the most 
common nondiscriminatory reasons for the [employer's action]. ,,220 If the 
employer produces evidence of its reasons for its action against the plaintiff, 
then the employer also admits that no other reasons-common or not-
motivated its action. Therefore, all other reasons, including those captured by 
the elements of the prima facie case, cannot possibly be relevant. 
In Reeves, the prima facie case is not only treated as relevant, but also given 
weight equal to evidence that the employer's reason is false. If, in Reeves, the 
term "prima facie case" means the standard prima facie elements, then that 
would render the employer's asserted reason no more important than the 
"prima facie element" reasons, which the employer does not claim influenced 
its decision. That simply makes no sense. 
The Kovacevich decision, in which the Sixth Circuit recognized the breadth 
of Aikens, offers a more sensible construction of Reeves. The Sixth Circuit 
explained, "[o]f course, evidence that bears upon elements of the prima facie 
case can also come into play in assessing the ultimate question of 
discrimination.,,221 The court then cited Reeves to support that proposition and 
noted parenthetically that Reeves "[took] into account the evidence supporting 
the plaintiffs prima facie case as part of its consideration of the 'ultimate 
question' of intentional discrimination.,,222 The Kovacevich decision is 
certainly correct that some of the evidence a plaintiff would present to prove 
her prima facie case would also be relevant to other issues in a discrimination 
case. To prove their prima facie case, plaintiffs must offer evidence on issues 
such as their qualifications or the level of their on-the-job performance. These 
issues often relate directly to the reasons employers give for rejecting or firing 
plaintiffs. 
If an employer's stated reason for not hiring or promoting a plaintiff is that 
220. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54. 
221. Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 827 (6th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). 
222. Id. (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 152-53 (2000). 
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the plaintiff was unqualified, then evidence the plaintiff presented to prove the 
"qualifications" element is also relevant in assessing the employer's reason. 
Similarly, if an employer's stated reason for firing a plaintiff is incompetence; 
then evidence introduced regarding the "adequacy of performance" element is 
relevant to that reason.223 Also, if the employer's stated reason for terminating 
a plaintiff is to cut staff, then the plaintiffs proof that she satisfied the 
"replaced by another" element can also rebut the employer's reason. 
"Qualifications" or "level of performance" evidence may be pertinent even if it 
does not directly counter the employer's stated reason for its action. For 
example, in Laxton, the Fifth Circuit relied on evidence of both the plaintiffs 
qualifications and level of performance to find that a jury could reasonably 
question the truth of the employer's claim that it fired the plaintiff for minor 
. I' f I' 224 VIO atlOns 0 po ICy. 
In such situations, evidence the plaintiff initially introduced to prove her 
prima facie case is reevaluated at the summary judgment phase because the 
evidence itself has probative value regarding the employer's motivation for the 
action at issue. Such evidence often indicates the falsity of the employer's 
prof erred reason for its action, which the Supreme Court in Reeves and 
elsewhere has recognized as "persuasive" evidence of a discriminatory 
motive.225 In other cases, the evidence is probative because it suggests the 
223. See Malamud, supra note 3, at 2285-87. Professor Malamud has even argued that because the 
evidence regarding the plaintiffs qualifications or competency and the evidence regarding the employer's 
reason is so often the same, the distinction between the McDonnell Douglas stages frequently breaks down. 
See id. 
224. Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 582-83 (5th Cir. 2003). The Laxton plaintiff presented evidence 
that she had a successful career in retail at other stores before the Gap lured her away with a $1,000 raise. 
Proof that her store's revenues exceeded quotas, she worked more than 70 hours a week, and the Gap rewarded 
her with monthly bonuses evidenced the plaintiffs high level of performance. 
225. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 14748 (2000). In Reeves, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial 
evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive. See St. 
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 517 (1993)] ("Proving the employer's reason false 
becomes part of (and often considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the real reason 
was intentional discrimination"). In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer 
from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory 
purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder 
is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty about a material fact as "affirmative evidence of guilt." 
Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277,296, 120 L. Ed. 2d 225,112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992); see also Wilson v. 
United States, 162 U.S. 613, 620-621,40 L. Ed. 1090, 16 S. Ct. 895 (1896); 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 278(2), p. 133 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979). Moreover, once the employer's justification has been 
eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the 
employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision. Cj Furnco Constr. 
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,577,57 L. Ed. 2d 957, 98 S. Ct. 2943 (1978) ("When all legitimate 
reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's 
actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts with some reason, 
based his decision on an impermissible consideration"). 
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employer had an improper motive for its action. In either situation, the 
evidence's probative value stands or falls on its own, without reference to the 
arbitrary construct of a "strong" or "weak" prima facie case. By contrast, the 
fact that the "prima facie case" as a whole is strong or weak has little or no 
probative value regarding the employer's motivation. For example, a prima 
facie case may be designated as "weak" because the plaintiff fails to present 
evaluations or other proof of "adequate performance." This designation, 
however, does not elucidate the employer's motivation if the employer claims it 
discharged the plaintiff as part of a staff reduction conducted in seniority order. 
In sum, after the employer has produced evidence of a reason, a court should 
draw a distinction between the "prima facie case" as a whole and the evidence 
that the plaintiff presented to support it. The prima facie case as a whole is no 
longer relevant, while some of the supporting evidence may be. This approach 
complies with Aikens because the evidence is being considered for proper 
reasons. Rather than considering the evidence because it proves a now 
irrelevant prima facie case, courts should consider prima facie evidence 
because it has probative value regarding issues still extant in the case-the 
credibility of the employer's stated reason and the employer's true motivation 
for its action.226 
Reeves should be construed in a way that is consistent with this approach, 
and therefore consistent with Aikens. Consequently, the term "prima facie 
case" in the Reeves list of factors should not be interpreted to mean the prima 
facie case as a whole, i.e., the standard elements of a prima facie case under 
McDonnell Douglas and its progeny.z27 Instead, "prima facie case" as a Reeves 
factor should be understood to refer to the plaintiffs underlying evidence in 
support of the prima facie case. In fact, this first Reeves factor should be 
interpreted to mean all the evidence presented by the plaintiff, other than the 
evidence that the employer's reason is false, which is captured by the second 
Reeves factor. 228 The first factor would then properly balance the third and 
final factor on the Reeves list, which is "any other evidence that supports the 
employer's case".z29 This Reeves construction would clarify the task of a court 
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147-48. 
226. This approach also addresses a concern raised by Professor Michael Zimmer, that some courts (e.g., 
the Fifth Circuit) have erroneously concluded that "the evidence establishing the plaintiffs prima facie case 
loses all its probative force once the defendant introduces its rebuttal evidence," and that this conclusion unduly 
weakens the plaintiffs case. Zimmer, Leading, supra note 171, at 179 (emphasis added). The better approach 
is to allow courts to consider evidence supporting the prima facie case but not the "prima facie case" and its 
elements. See supra notes 221-225 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra Part III.A (discussing cases applying typical "list of elements" definition of prima facie 
case). 
228. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149 (listing second factor as "the probative value of the proof that the 
employer's explanation is false"). 
229. Id. 
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deciding a discrimination case on summary judgment: to consider all the 
evidence presented by the plaintiff and defendant, and assess its probative value 
on the central question of the employer's motivation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
What is the role of the prima facie case stage of the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis? The Supreme Court has stated that the prima facie case "eliminates 
the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the [employer's action].,,230 
Professor Michael Zimmer has described the prima facie case as the first step in 
"a process of elimination in which circumstantial evidence is used 
progressively to eliminate possible actions for the employer's actions other than 
discrimination.,,23I Echoing the Supreme Court, Professor Zimmer has said, 
"[t]he evidence of the prima facie case operates to negate the inference that any 
of the most common, nondiscriminatory reasons explains defendant's 
action. ,,232 
Courts have also stated that the prima facie case functions to force the 
employer to produce a reason for its action, rather than merely denying 
discriminatory motive and saying nothing about its true motive. The Eleventh 
Circuit has explained, "[t]o assist him in this endeavor [of proving 
discrimination], the plaintiff may, if he chooses, attempt to establish the 
McDonnell Douglas presumption and thereby force the defendant to articulate a 
lawful reason for the adverse employment action.,,233 Similarly, the Second 
Circuit has stated that "the McDonnell Douglas presumption ... is designed to 
force employers to come forward with reasons .... ,,234 Scholars have also 
recognized that the prima facie case, and the mandatory presumption it creates, 
is intended to compel the employer to come forward with a reason for its 
action.235 
Consequently, once the employer produces its reasons for its challenged 
action, the "prima facie case" serves no viable purpose in the case. The second 
purpose, of pushing the employer to produce its reason, has been accomplished. 
The first purpose, of negating possible nondiscriminatory reasons, is immaterial 
once the employer asserts actual reasons for its decision. It is worth recalling 
230. Tex. Dep't ofCmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 
231. Zimmer, Leading, supra note 171, at 177. 
232. Id. at 181. 
233. Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999). 
234. James v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149. 154 (2d Cir. 2000). 
235. See Chambers, Discrimination, supra note 172, at 559 ("That the presumption of discrimination is 
fully negated with the mere articulation of a reason for the job action suggests that the presumption was meant 
as a strong incentive for the employer to present a case rather than as a reflection of a belief that the prima facie 
case actually proves discrimination."); Michael Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence: Individual Disparate Treatment 
Discrimination and the ADEA, 51 MERCER L. REv. 693, 706 (2000) (explaining that McDonnell Douglas 
"creat[es] a rebuttable presumption of liability to force the employer to come forward with the 
nondiscriminatory reason it claims justified its decision."). 
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that the possible "reasons" covered by the elements of the prima facie case are 
not based on evidence in an instant case or any particular case. They were 
established by the Supreme Court and other courts in the abstrat.t, based on the 
courts' speculation about what are likely to be the most common reasons that 
employers fire employees, or reject them for hiring or promotion. Once the 
employer identifies reasons as the ones that actually motivated it, there is no 
need for "speculative" reasons. They need not be negated; they can and should 
be cast aside. 
It is also worth recalling that at the prima facie stage, the "possible" reasons 
are not proved by the employer, but are to be disproved by the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff carries the burden to prove that she applied, met the required 
qualifications, or performed adequately. Thus, "weakness" in the prima facie 
case always refers to the absence of evidence, not to the presence of evidence 
that one of the "prima facie reasons" actually motivated the employer. A 
factfinder must base her determination that a nondiscriminatory reason 
motivated the employer on evidence present in the record. It would be 
unreasonable to base the finding of motive on the absence of evidence, and so 
it would be unreasonable to base it on "weakness" in the prima facie case. 
After the employer has produced the purported reasons for its decision, the 
reasons implicated by the prima facie case no longer relate to any real factual 
issues in the case. Of course, if any of the employer's proffered reasons 
coincide with a "prima facie case" reason, then that reason is relevant. It 
remains relevant because the employer has given it as a reason, not because it is 
an element of the prima facie case. By contrast, when an element of the prima 
facie case has not been identified by the employer as one of the true reasons for 
its action, then there is no basis for finding that element to have any connection 
with the employer's motivation. 
In some cases, courts consider a prima facie element when deciding 
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law although the prima facie 
element does not relate to any real factual issues in the case. In such 
circumstances, the prima facie case operates as an artificial obstacle the 
plaintiff must overcome. For example, a court can dismiss the plaintiffs case 
for "weak" qualifications, even when the employer never claimed insufficient 
qualifications as the reason for its decision. Each of the prima facie elements 
then imposes an arbitrary condition the plaintiff must satisfy, even when no one 
claims the element had anything to do with the employer's motive. This is 
tantamount to requiring, in a personal injury case, the plaintiff to prove that she 
has a good driving record, even if no one alleges she caused the accident. In an 
even more apt analogy, this is comparable to allowing a court adjudicating a 
personal injury case to weigh the plaintiffs poor academic record compiled 
years before the accident. 
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The McDonnell Douglas analysis, particularly the "prima facie case" in the 
first stage, has come in for much recent criticism?36 There is currently a debate 
among many scholars over whether the McDonnell Douglas analysis should be 
abandoned and replaced. I hope to, in the future, join in that debate myself. 
Right now, that scholarly debate is ahead of the facts on the ground. Courts 
around the country are still using the McDonnell Douglas analysis to decide 
hundreds of discrimination cases every month?37 McDonnell Douglas will 
continue to be used in discrimination litigation for at least the next several 
years, despite all its flaws. Therefore, it is imperative that courts not compound 
the flaws of the McDonnell Douglas analysis by giving its most-criticized 
component, the prima facie case, undue weight in the final stage of the analysis. 
The prima facie case was designed to perform its functions in the first stage 
of the analysis: to screen out hypothetical nondiscriminatory reasons why the 
plaintiff suffered adverse employment action, and to pressure the employer to 
assert its reasons for that action. The work of the prima facie case is complete 
when an employment discrimination case reaches the second stage of the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis, a reality that the Supreme Court recognized in 
Aikens. Ignoring that vital lesson and allowing the prima facie case to pop up 
again will cause innumerable problems and wreak injustice in case after case. 
236. See supra note 3 (citing commentators who have criticized first stage of McDonnell Douglas 
framework). 
237. In a LEXIS search on January 17,2006, the author found more than 1,700 cases that had applied the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis to a discrimination case in 2005 and early 2006. 

